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Abstract. Security and trust are two properties of modern computing systems
that are the focus of much recent interest. They play an increasingly signiﬁcant
role in the requirements for modern computing systems. Security has been stud-
ied thoroughly for many years, particularly the sub-domain of cryptography. The
use of computing science formal methods has facilitated cryptanalysis of security
protocols. At the moment, trust is intensively studied, but not well understood.
Here we present our approach based on formal methods for modelling and vali-
dating the notion of trust in computing science.
1 Introduction
Recent years have seen a growing concern with security properties of computing sys-
tems. Thisconcernis mainlycausedbytwo reasons.First, thereis anincreasingnumber
of faults in computing systems. This increase in turn ensues from two facts. The pene-
tration of computingscience in our professional and personal lives is still expanding,as
new computing paradigms such as pervasive computing show. At the same time, pro-
grams become overly cluttered and computationally and semantically more complex.
The second reason explaining security concerns is that the concept of security itself is
widening. This is illustrated by recent problems like privacy breaches (e.g. spam) or
violations of legal obligations (e.g. liability via software license).
Notions of trust are constituent in several cryptographic methods, representing the
conﬁdenceintheassociationofacryptographickeytotheidentityofaprincipal.Recent
multidisciplinary studies on trust envisage the concept as a more general and richer
notion than security. Many models of trust have been devised, each concentrating on
disparate aspects, among which are recommendations and reputation, belief theory, or
risk and uncertainty. It appears that the vast number of notions composing trust deﬁes
its systematic analysis.
Computing science formal methods [11] stem from mathematics and aim to help
design, develop,analyse and validate software so that it is correct,error-freeand robust.
Formal models are built on well-known mathematical elements, like sets or functions,
and can be analysed against accurate properties, such as consistency or completeness.
Formal methods include Petri nets, abstract state machines, process calculi, temporal
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Next Wave Technologies and Markets Programme.and belief logics, and languages such as Z [4], CSP [5] and Alloy [9]. The last decade
has seen a trend to use formal methods in computing science, notably in the context
of industrial software engineering, because they provide solid methods, produce clear
models and have good tool support.
In this paper,we present in section 2 how the security ﬁeld has used formal methods
to solidly build some of its foundations on mathematically proven results. We show
initial works in the applicationof formal methods in trust in section 3, arguingthat trust
is only at the beginning of its path to make the most of formal methods. Our structured
approach based on UML [14] and B [13] formal methods is ﬁnally deﬁned in section 4.
2 Formally Proving Security Properties
Security is one of the major problems that computer scientists have to confront nowa-
days. Security analysis of computing systems consists of creating models of how they
operate, may be attacked, and should behave. Formal methods are helpful at modelling
and validating existing computing systems with regard to security properties because
they provide a structured approach and accurate notations.
In the context of security, the system model must not only abstract the programs
implementing the system functionalities but also the communication protocols that are
used. Formal approaches have been successfully applied to that latter task, for example
with the Z notation or the B method [15]. Recently, the analysis [26] of layers of net-
work protocols, involving the commonly used TLS/SSL protocols, have been a further
beneﬁciary of the formal approach.
Themodelofthepossibleattackstothesystemiscalledthethreatmodelanddeﬁnes
the capabilities of the attacker. The Dolev-Yao threat model traditionally represents an
attacker that can overhear, intercept, and synthesise any message and is only limited
by the constraints of the cryptographic methods used. This omnipotence has been very
difﬁcult to model and most threat models simplify it, as, for example, the attacker in
ubiquitous computing [22].
Next, the desired properties of the system need to be deﬁned. Security encompasses
six basic sub-properties: authentication, data integrity, conﬁdentiality, non-repudiation,
privacy, and availability. Speciﬁcation of the chosen properties is in general dependent
on the notation chosen for the system and threat models.
The last task is to verify that the security properties hold in the system model, com-
plemented by the threat model if it exists. Many formal methods ease this step by ap-
plying powerful automated techniques, like test generation or model checking. General
formal tools can be used, like the Coq theorem prover [3] that has been used for the
veriﬁcation of the conﬁdentiality of the C-SET protocol [8], or speciﬁc ones devised,
such as Casper [10] for compiling abstract descriptionsto the CSP language,or SpyDer
[23] to model-check security properties in the spy-calculus.
In summary,formal methods have beneﬁted security analysis of computingsystems
by providing systematic methods and reusable tools in order to obtain mathematically
proven results. The use of formal methods for security analysis is a very active domain,
which evolves with progress from the formal methods and provides a testbed for them.3 Formally Modelling Trust
Trust has recently attracted much focus, notably in the context of computing science
and more speciﬁcally computer security.Marsh [24] gave an early (1992)formal model
of trust, highlighting the combination of basic and general trust and agent capabilities
into situational trust via ad hoc notations. Grifﬁths et al [21] made use of the Z formal
notation to specify cooperative plans in multi-agent systems, annotating these plans
with trust information.Many mathematicalmodels have also been devised, for example
in game theory (e.g. Birk’s model [2]) or probability theory (e.g. Jøsang’s Subjective
Logic [1]).
More recently, Grandison [25] devised the SULTAN trust management system and
his primitives were expressed in the manner of a logic programming language. SUL-
TAN is similar to works on trust policy languages. Trust policy languages (which are
inspired by security policies) specify what is permitted and prohibited regarding trust
decisions, rather than expressing how. They were ﬁrst devised in the context of Public
Key Infrastructures, like IBM’s Trust Policy Language or Fidelis [28]. Recent works
exhibit more general policies, like those of the SECURE project [17] where domain
theory is used to deﬁne trust policies able to specify spam ﬁlters.
Trust is a complexnotion that is not well understood.Growing interest in modelling
the notion of trust has given rise to a plethora of models and many aspects of trust are
currentlybeingstudied.However,thesemodelsaredifﬁculttocomparedirectlybecause
theyareexpressedin diverseways,i.e. sociologicaloreconomicterms,andfurthermore
use speciﬁc notations, thus preventing an unambiguous interpretation. Identifying trust
requirements is not always easy and, because they lead to a clearer model of a system
and guide its analysis, formal speciﬁcations can ease that identiﬁcation.
4 An Approach to the Modelling and Validation of Trust
The T-SAS (Trusted Software Agents and Services in Pervasive Information Environ-
ment)project[27]aims to identifycriticaltrust issues in pervasivecomputing.Inpartic-
ular, it aims to develop tools and rigorous techniques for validating the trustworthiness
of agent and Semantic Web/Grid technologies that support pervasive systems.
The identiﬁcation of critical trust issues for pervasive environments is hampered by
boththediverseliteratureontrustandlackofexpertisebysystemdesignersandanalysts
at identifyingissues of trust. As noted above,existing deﬁnitions of trust also tend to be
either speciﬁc to particularproblemdomains,or contrarily,toogeneral.This oftenleads
to speciﬁcations impoverished of trust content suitable for analysis and formalisation.
Finally, pervasive systems require that user-centric issues are at least as important as
purely technical concerns.
To address these problems, whilst ensuring that scenarios studied are sufﬁciently
realistic, the initial phase of this project has focused on the development of an anal-
ysis framework grounded in propitious (healthcare) scenarios and use-cases [16]. It is
an iterative process of scenario validation by domain experts (e.g. clinicians), identiﬁ-
cation of trust issues with cross-scenario checking, and domain expert aided scenario
maturation. As this process repeats, the scenarios become increasingly rich with trustrelated detail and the taxonomy of trust derived from the input scenarios stabilises. In
our analyses, trust issues have fallen into eleven basic areas. Viz., Source versus Inter-
pretation, Accuracy, Audit trails, Authorisation, Identiﬁcation,Personal Responsibility,
Reliability/Integrity, Availability, Reasoning, Usability and Harm. The relationship be-
tween trust categories was broadly in agreement with the literature.
Our current work focuses upon the formal speciﬁcation stage of a software and
hardware prototype.The prototypehealthcareapplication operates on a PDA to support
clinicians in a pervasive environment with medical image messaging services. This ap-
plication is based on a use-case representing a clinician roaming in the pervasive envi-
ronment of his hospital and using his PDA to display pictures on a neighbour device or
to access the informationof a patient in an adjoiningbed. The PDA currentlyhas image
capture, wireless transmission and receipt and can provide telemetry for location de-
termination. The prototype PDA and infrastructure provides furtive ground for dealing
with real-time and practical issues whilst retaining many trust concerns.
Using a single method (whether formal or not) to develop complex software and/or
hardware systems may limit the ability to adequately tackle complex problems in the
large.Unfortunately,manyissues of trust are interrelatedand highly contextdependent.
Therefore, simpliﬁcation of a system which results in loss of this context or corruption
of trust interdependencies and interactions is dangerous.
Formal methods are often associated with applications with some critical aspect
with severe consequencesof fault. For example,safety-, economic-,or security-critical.
We believe that users’ trust in pervasive computing environmentsis prone to signiﬁcant
collapse and also that the consequences would be equally undesirable. In short, perva-
sive computing applications are trust-critical. Yet, the widespread adoption of formal
techniques to deal with trust issues is not solely based on risk aversion – tools must be
developedthat will be used by software engineers, designers and system analysts. Also,
formal speciﬁcations are not readily communicable to the non-specialist.
In addition to the ability to visually communicate and simplify complex designs,
semi-formal techniques such as UML offer the developer additional beneﬁts such as
maintainability and re-usability. Despite several studies showing that formal devel-
opment requires approximately the same overall effort as traditional approaches [12]
whilst providing the detection and correction of speciﬁcation errors early in the devel-
opment life-cycle, uptake has again, remained slow.
Finally,giventhe currentlylimited understandingof trust, it seems sensible to adopt
an approach that automatically detects inconsistencies and enables system designers to
produce unambiguous and consistent speciﬁcations.
In order to successfully negotiate the problems of developers (expertise and think-
ing methods, visualization, re-usability, maintenance, communicability), we use UML
case tools which provide a powerfulvisual notation which can itself be analysed, tested
and validated automatically. The UML is an intuitive and powerful visual notation that
decomposes a formal model of a system into various diagrams, such as class, collab-
oration or statechart diagrams. To automate validation of the models we need to use
a method which allows formal proof. We chose the B language, which is an abstract
machine notation that structures systems into hierarchy of modules. Each B module ismadeofcomponentsthatare themselvesreﬁnedatdifferentlevelsofabstraction.Figure
1 portrays an overview of this approach.
Fig.1. Overview of approach
To annotate UML with B, we use a UML Proﬁle, called UML-B [6], that deﬁnes
a speciﬁc kind of UML model that has a particular semantics. Figure 1 illustrates a
UML-B model. In UML-B, class and statechart diagrams are annotated with B code
using an object-orienteddot style. A tool, called U2B [7], then automatically generates,
whenever possible, an equivalent B speciﬁcation from the UML-B model.
Fig.2. UML-B screenshot
Theﬁnalstep is to validateourB modelsusinga combinationofautomatedtest case
generation (e.g. ProTest [19]) and model checking (e.g. ProB [18]). Figure 3 shows
a screenshot of the ProB tool. The top left shows the B machine under examination,
bottom left shows the current machine state and status of the invariants. Right of the
ﬁgure shows the states visited during the model checking of the speciﬁcation.
In the context of our use-case, the basic components of trust will be expressed by
means of invariantsof the B machines.At this stage duringour development,the invari-
ants represent properties of the categories Accuracy, Authorisation, Identiﬁcation and
Reliability/Integrity that hold between the various elements of the system (e.g. PDA,
Web Services, etc.). We are testing in these models, among other aspects, whether the
PDA displays a picture on a wall-mounted screen in a trustworthy manner. Figure 2
shows an example class diagram relating a doctor, his PDA, a document (for viewing
on an external device), an external device (display), and a centralised system for man-
aging services based on the user’s location, gained fromWiFi 802.11signal processing.
These tools will verify that our UML-B models are consistent, thus proving the
trust properties that we have speciﬁed in the B invariants. If the properties do not hold,
the test case or the counter-example provided by the model checker will enable us to
analyse where the problem is and formulate a solution. We would then go into another
round of modelling and validation. Finally, we note that this UML and B hybridisationFig.3. ProB screenshot
has been favourably examined in an industrial setting, showing that not only are the
features of the B-Method and UML complimentary, but that development with these
tools was acceptable to commercial enterprise [20].
5 Conclusion
Formal methods for the speciﬁcation of computer systems and their required properties
have shown themselves a valuable tool for security analysis. Much work in the domain
of trust devised more or less formal models, thus providing insight into the notion of
trust but without formal proofs of the claimed results. The notion of trust remains elu-
sive and has not yet achieved the same level of knowledge that security has.
The lack of formality in the followed approaches is sometimes the cause of misun-
derstanding and prevents the validation of the proposed models. We believe that vali-
dation is necessary to acquire a sufﬁcient conﬁdence in a model and formal methods
can provide us with the tools to exhaustively check the proposed solutions. Here we
suggest that the rigorous process of formal speciﬁcation, with its associated techniques
and tools for model checking and test case validation, will be as valuable to the study
of trust as it has been to date for security.
Prior work in our project, based on several real-world scenarios and applications,
produced a set of basic components of trust, which with tools for assisting formal spec-
iﬁcation and validation are being utilised to expedite formal analysis and test this sug-
gestion. We believe that the practical application of formal methods can facilitate the
development and evolution of the ﬁeld of trust analysis in computing systems.
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